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Abstract:  To  enable  the  growth  of  wireless  networks  in  high  assurance  computer  systems,  it  is 
essential to establish a security engineering methodology that provides system security managers with 
a procedural engineering process to develop computer security policies. Our research demonstrates 
how  wireless  communication  technology  is  deployed  using  the  Multiple  Independent  Levels  of 
Security (MILS) architecture for high assurance computer system design of security and safety-critical 
multi-enclave  systems  to  provide  a  framework  for  supporting  the  enforcement  of  diverse  security 
multi-policies. The established wireless inter-enclave multi-policy paradigm manages multiple wireless 
security policies within heterogeneous systems. Applying the policy refinement rules presented in this 
work for a security enforcement procedure of an application system will reduce the proof effort for 
secure components. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  High  assurance  computer  systems  are  those  that 
require convincing evidence that the system adequately 
addresses critical properties such as security and safety 
objectives
[8].  They  are  used  in  environments  where 
failure can cause security breaches or even the loss of 
life.  Examples  include  avionics,  weapons  controls, 
intelligence gathering, and life-support systems. Before 
such  systems  can  be  deployed,  there  must  exist 
convincing evidence that they support critical safety, as 
well as security, properties. 
  Security  in  high  assurance  computer  systems 
involves protecting systems’ entities from unauthorized 
access. We use the term entity to refer to any source or 
destination through which information can flow (e.g., 
user, subject, object, file, printer). Several issues have 
to be addressed in order to have systems function in a 
secure manner, including authorization, authentication, 
and  software  and  hardware  correctness.  Our  work 
focuses  on  security  policies  in  relation  to  wireless 
communication.  In  this  paper,  we  use  the  following 
terms: security enclave (coalition) to refer to a logical 
boundary  for  a  group  of  entities  that  have  the  same 
security level; and message to refer to any data that has 
been encoded for transmission to or received from an 
entity  (e.g.,  a  method  invocation,  a  response  to  a 
request,  a  program,  passing  a  variable,  a  network 
packet). The transmission mechanism can utilize shared 
memory, zero-copy message transport, kernel supported 
transport, TCP/IP, and so forth. 
  In the computer security literature, the term policy 
has been used in a variety of ways. Policies can be a set 
of rules to manage resources (e.g., actions based on a 
certain event(s)) or definite goals to determine present 
and future decisions; we provided a detailed discussion 
of the meaning of policy in our earlier work
[17]. Broadly 
speaking,  a  computer  policy  should  address  security 
issues:  CIA  (Confidentiality,  Integrity,  Availability). 
Although not a requirement for the work described in 
this paper, our work focuses on MILS (see the MILS 
Architecture Section). Security policies in MILS can be 
multi-level (e.g., based on security classification: Top 
Secret, Secret, Confidential, Unclassified) and contain 
mandatory components that specify rules that guarantee 
only authorized message transmission between entities 
by imposing constraints on the actions (operations) of 
these entities. In addition, MILS can support other types 
of  policies  such  as  RBAC,  DAC,  corporate  policies, 
and so forth. 
  The issues of wireless communication and demand 
for  mobility  have  recently  been  receiving  more 
attention.  The  field  of  wireless  security  policies  and 
policy  engineering  is  relatively  new.  There  exists 
various  research  work  in  the  literature  that  discusses 
security  policies.  However,  very  little  of  this  work 
discusses  enforcing  diverse  multi-policies  in  high J. Computer Sci., 3 (9): 726-735, 2007 
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assurance  multi-enclave  systems  in  the  context  of 
wireless communication technology. 
  This paper outlines a novel wireless inter-enclave 
multi-policy  technique  that  provides  system  security 
managers  with  a  framework  for  supporting  the 
enforcement of diverse security multi-policies in high 
assurance  computer  systems.  We  present  an 
architecture  that  provides  a  basis  for  the  support  of 
multiple policies, both individually and in composition. 
The architecture provides for a procedural mapping of 
high-level  system  security  policies  into  low-level 
implementation  mechanisms  that  can  be  verified  to 
enforce the policies. 
  Although security plays a major role in the design 
of software systems, it is still not considered an explicit 
part of the development process. Security requirements 
are usually added to an already existing system. As a 
result, this leads to numerous problems with the overall 
security design. Policies should be taken into account 
early on in the development process. The problems and 
techniques  that  this  research  presents  are  significant 
because  wireless  security  policies  play  an  important 
role in the success of a secure wireless environment. 
 
WIRELESS SECURITY 
 
  Because  wireless  communication  provides  an 
increase in connectivity, it also creates an increase in 
security  vulnerabilities.  In  wireless  networks,  the 
communication  medium  (air)  is  a  major  source  of 
vulnerability that jeopardizes security. While  wireless 
networks provide increased mobility for entities, they 
provide easier access for attackers. To access traffic in a 
traditional wired network, an entity has to be physically 
connected to the network. 
 
What is Wireless?: Wireless is a technology that uses 
radio  frequency  to  allow  transmission  of  information 
over  electromagnetic  waves  between  communicating 
entities  without  establishing  a  physical  connection 
between  them  via  cables.  Wireless  technology  is 
emerging  as  a  significant  medium  through  which 
signals  can  travel  as  a  means  for  communication.  A 
wireless  network  is  an  addition  to  an  existing  wired 
network foundation. It provides entities with access to 
the  Internet  and/or  network  resources  without  being 
physically  connected  via  cables.  A  wireless  network 
can  be  established  using  two  design  structures: 
infrastructure or ad hoc. An infrastructure network uses 
a wireless access point to transmit messages between 
entities.  A  wireless  access  point  is  a  device  that  is 
usually connected to a wired network and can send and 
receive  information  between  wireless  and  wired 
devices. It acts as an Ethernet bridge between a wireless 
entity and a wired network. An ad hoc network allows 
entities  to  directly  connect  to  one  another  without 
having to go through an access point. 
Wireless  Security  Challenges:  Wireless  networks 
broadcast  data  into  the  air  and  any  wireless  entity 
within range can monitor traffic. However, we propose 
using wireless technology in a MILS system mainly due 
to  free  movement  convenience  and  ease  of 
implementation. Its benefits include the following: 
· Mobility:  entities  that  are  on  the  move  (changing 
position all the time) can connect to the network and 
have  access  to  information  regardless  of  their 
location. 
· Ease of installation procedures and implementation: 
no laying out of cables is needed, which allows for 
fast installation. 
· Installation  cost:  in  dynamic  environments  where 
there  are  frequent  changes,  setting  up  a  wireless 
environment will save costs of laying new cables. 
· Flexibility: once the infrastructure has been set, new 
entities can be added to the system without the need 
for  any  extra  hardware  or  software  and  without 
affecting other existing entities. In addition, there are 
situations  where  cable  is  not  possible  (e.g.,  air 
vehicles). 
  With wireless benefits come certain shortcomings, 
including: 
· Security risks: some security challenges of wireless 
networks include lack of or weak encryption and user 
authentication. Computer attacks enable intruders not 
only to have access to the information that is being 
transmitted  over  the  air,  but  also  the  ability  to 
transmit  messages  on  the  wired  network.  Wireless 
networks  are  open  to  several  attacks,  including 
attacks  on  network  confidentiality,  integrity,  and 
availability
[13].  Attacks  on  confidentiality  include 
eavesdropping,  entity  authentication  compromise, 
and encryption key compromise. Attacks on integrity 
involve  unauthorized  modification  of  information 
(e.g.,  man-in-the-middle  attack,  session  hijacking). 
Attacks  on  availability  involve  preventing  entities 
from using a resource (e.g., denial-of-service attack). 
· Bandwidth and speed overhead: wireless devices are 
restricted  to  function  in  some  electromagnetic 
bandwidth; lower data transmission rate is caused by 
lower network bandwidth and noise. As a result, the 
speed of wireless networks is less than that of wired 
networks  and  in  network  congestion  situations, 
entities will face delays due to network performance. 
· Radio  wave  interference:  due  to  severe  weather 
conditions, wireless signals may be prevented from 
being transmitted properly. Also, the signal strength 
may  be  limited  due  to  geographic  obstacles  (e.g., 
mountain, bridge). 
Since  wireless  networks  are  more  vulnerable  to 
attacks, it is crucial to implement measures to prevent 
such  attacks  and  secure  a  wireless  network.  Such 
measures include firewalls, end-to-end encryption of all J. Computer Sci., 3 (9): 726-735, 2007 
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information  being  transmitted,  user  authentication  to 
prevent  unauthorized  users,  virus  protection,  and 
prevention  of  unauthorized  (rogue)  access  points.  In 
addition,  security  audits  should  constantly  be 
implemented  to  ensure  the  security  of  wired  and 
wireless networks. Logging wireless and wired events 
enables system security managers to identify scenarios 
where attackers might be attempting to compromise a 
network. 
 
Wireless Communication Security Policies: Policies 
for wired and wireless networks are crucial elements of 
systems’  security.  In  MILS,  security  policies  are 
designed not only to guide information access, but also 
to control conflicts and cooperation of security policies 
of  different  security  enclaves
[17].  We  strongly  believe 
that  no  enforcement  of  security  standards  can  be 
effectively  made  without  the  support  of  security 
policies. 
  One important issue policy developers should keep 
in mind when designing security policies is that policies 
have to be flexible enough to evolve with new wireless 
environments.  According to  Verma
[16], in order to be 
effective  (flexible),  policies  need  to  meet  certain 
requirements:  policies  must  be  easily  specified  and 
understood by human operators, precisely defined and 
enforced,  compatible  with  the  capabilities  of  the 
network  element  where  they  may  be  enforced,  and 
consistent  to  avoid  conflicts  and  ambiguous 
decision-making. 
  Wireless security policies play an important role in 
the  success  of  a  secure  wireless  environment.  As  a 
result, careful design, implementation, and enforcement 
of  security  policies  are  crucial  in  reducing  security 
vulnerability  while  at  the  same  time  maximizing 
network performance. In addition, routine audits should 
be  done  to  monitor  policy  compliance  and  wireless 
usage  so  that  all  activities  can  be  traced  back  to  an 
entity.  Despite  the  security  risks  associated  with 
wireless technology, the security of wireless networks 
can  be  increased  by  developing  and  implementing  a 
comprehensive  security  policy  along  with  the  use  of 
new  wireless  technology  devices  and  enforcement 
mechanisms. 
 
MILS ARCHITECTURE 
 
  In the past, secure systems were designed with the 
concept of a security kernel and a Trusted Computing 
Base (TCB)
[6]. The key concept behind this approach is 
that  the  security  decisions  and  security  enforcement 
mechanisms are an integral part of the TCB. Following 
this  design  paradigm,  development  teams  found  that 
more  and  more  of  their  system’s  functionality  was 
being  included  in  the  TCB.  Once  this  occurred,  the 
evaluation  of  the  system’s  security  became 
unmaintainable. 
  Traditionally,  the  military  model  of  a  secure 
operating  system  includes  the  concept  of  multi-level 
security (MLS). The idea behind this concept is that the 
system will be processing data items that are classified 
at different levels of security, and the information flow 
security policy that prevents the transfer of high-level 
classified information into unauthorized objects must be 
preserved. The MLS concept has applications outside 
the military, including communications within critical 
infrastructures  and  safety-critical  real-time  control 
systems. Therefore, we define an MLS system as one 
that processes and outputs data at multiple classification 
levels.  Classic  security  models,  such  as  the 
Bell-LaPadula model
[5], have been used to specify the 
secure behavior of MLS systems. 
 
The Need for MILS: MILS is a joint research effort 
between academia, industry, and government led by the 
United  States  Air  Force  Research  Laboratory  with 
stakeholder input from many participants, including the 
Air  Force,  Army,  Navy,  National  Security  Agency, 
Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Objective Interface Systems, 
Green  Hills  Software,  Lynux  Works,  Wind  River, 
General  Dynamics,  Raytheon,  Rockwell  Collins, 
MITRE, and the University of Idaho
[1, 2, 7]. 
  The  MILS  architecture  is  created  to  simplify  the 
process  of  the  specification,  design,  and  analysis  of 
high assurance computer systems
[19]. This approach is 
based on the concept of  separation, as  introduced by 
Rushby
[14].  Through  separation,  we  can  develop  a 
hierarchy of security services where each level uses the 
security  services  of  a  lower  level  or  peer  entities  to 
provide a new security functionality that can be used by 
higher  levels.  Effectively,  the  operating  system  and 
middleware  become  partners  with  application  level 
entities to enforce application-specific security policies. 
Limiting  the  scope  and  complexity  of  the  security 
mechanisms  provides  us  with  manageable,  and  more 
importantly,  evaluatable  implementations.  A  MILS 
system isolates processes into partitions, which define a 
collection of data objects, code, and system resources. 
Partitions are defined by the kernel’s configuration and 
can  be  evaluated  separately.  This  divide-and-conquer 
approach  will  reduce  the  proof  effort  for  secure 
systems. 
  What is needed is a complete system architecture 
that  partitions  system  functionality  into  manageable 
units.  The  MILS  architecture  does  precisely  that,  it 
works  by  partitioning  programs,  their  data,  and  their J. Computer Sci., 3 (9): 726-735, 2007 
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communications.  A  traditional  deployment  would 
consist  of  a  Separation  Kernel  (SK),  Real-Time 
Operating  System  (RTOS),  CORBA  middleware,  a 
GIOP Guard, a MILS Message Router (MMR), and a 
Partitioning Communications System (PCS). 
 
Definition 1:  A  guard  is  a  trusted  (satisfies  security 
requirements)  computing  component  that  enforces 
policies associated with certain types of communication 
channels. The type of messages it can sanitize is unique 
(e.g., GIOP, HTML, TCP/IP). 
 
Definition 2:  An  MMR  is  a  trusted  computing 
component  that  enforces  both  edge  policies  and 
inter-partition  communication.  If  messages  between 
partitions are of a specific type, then the MMR routes 
these messages to appropriate guards or rejects them. 
 
Definition 3: A PCS is a trusted computing component 
that enforces inter-processor communication. 
 
  Several  MILS  benefits  are  appealing  to 
government  departments  and  agencies,  including  the 
military  and  defense  systems.  Information,  no  matter 
what  domain  it  belongs  to,  can  exist  on  the  same 
distributed  system  while  preserving  separation.  The 
need  for  MLS  systems  has  increased  with  the 
interconnection of multiple systems into a GIG (Global 
Information Grid). The MILS architecture has several 
advantages, including
[9]: 
· The  difficulty  of  certification  of  MLS  systems  is 
resolved by separating the security mechanisms and 
concerns into manageable components. This provides 
an increase in the security and safety of systems. 
· Hardware is reduced since a system can be built on 
the  separation  kernel  where  physically  isolated 
processors are not required. This provides space and 
power reduction. 
· A  single  physical  processor  can  host  multiple 
applications at different security levels. This provides 
easier management of information between different 
entities. 
· Real-time performance can be supported in a securely 
partitioned system. 
 
MILS Layers: The MILS architecture is designed and 
implemented  in  layers.  MILS  is  divided  into  three 
layers,  which  consists  of  a  separation  kernel  (and 
hardware:  processor,  physical  memory,  assigned 
devices), middleware (and operating system services), 
and  application.  Each  policy  enforces  security  at  a 
given layer and provides secure services for the layer 
that is immediately above it. Some partitions  will be 
designated multi-single level secure (MSLS), consisting 
of  a  single  data  classification,  while  others  will  be 
multi-level  secure  supporting  several  data 
classifications
[2].  Figure 1  shows  the  MILS  layered 
architecture  using  Top  Secret  (TS)  and  Secret  (S) 
applications. Notice that the partitions could be running 
different operating systems (OS1, OS2, OS3, OSn) or 
the same operating system. 
 
Hardware
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…
Partition 1 Partition 2 Partition 3 Partition n
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Middleware 
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Middleware 
OS2 Services
Middleware 
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Fig. 1: MILS layered architecture. 
 
  The SK segregates entities and their resources into 
isolated execution spaces (partitions). The SK divides a 
host processor into multiple partitions that are logically 
separated in space and time. Each partition appears to 
have its own dedicated processor (virtual machine). The 
separation kernel partitions space into different memory 
areas for each process to access. The SK partitions time 
into intervals that are allocated to each entity. Time is 
allocated  based  on  time-slice  scheduling  (static)  or 
preemptive priorities (dynamic). 
  Entities  running  in  different  partitions  cannot 
communicate  unless  explicitly  permitted  by  the 
separation  kernel.  However,  the  SK  only  enforces 
communication at the message level. If needed, we can 
place the MMR in a separate partition to enforce finer 
granularity policies. If messages between partitions are 
of a specific type, then the MMR routes these messages 
to appropriate guards or rejects them (possibly sending 
a  specified  response).  If  a  guard  determines  that  the 
content  of  a  message  is  not  in  compliance  with  the 
information flow policy, the guard will notify the MMR 
which will then disallow the communication attempt or 
take action based on the security policy. 
 
Separation  Kernel  Layer:  The  foundational 
component of MILS is the separation kernel which is 
the lowest level layer. It creates partitions and monitors J. Computer Sci., 3 (9): 726-735, 2007 
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change  of  control  between  them.  The  SK  is  a  small 
software  component  (typically  not  more  than  6,000 
lines of code) that is trusted to guarantee separation of 
time  and  space  partitioning.  MILS  SK  is  based  on 
enforcing  data  isolation,  information  flow,  periods 
processing,  and  damage  limitation  policies.  Data 
isolation  protects  data  segments  within  partitioned 
applications  from  being  read  or  corrupted  by 
unauthorized entities or applications. Information flow 
ensures  that  only  authorized  communication  between 
partitioned applications can occur. Periods processing 
ensures  that  when  the  execution  between  partitioned 
applications is being switched, shared resources (e.g., 
processor registers) are sanitized (no information from 
one  partition  can  be  read  by  another).  Damage 
limitation guarantees that failure caused by damages in 
one  partitioned  application  does  not  compromise  the 
continued processing of other applications. 
 
Middleware  Layer:  The  MILS  middleware  contains 
mediation  and  communication  components  that  are 
responsible for controlling messages between entities. It 
could include a secure version of real-time CORBA and 
other operating system services that are excluded from 
the SK, such as device drivers and network services
[2]. 
It also includes a trusted PCS component that extends 
the  separation  that  the  SK  provides  to  include 
communication  between  different  distributed  systems. 
The middleware may also include a publish-subscribe 
DDS and DBMS libraries. The middleware can reside 
in  the  same  partition  that  an  application  uses  or  in 
separate partitions. 
 
Application  Layer:  At  this  layer,  users  run  their 
applications  that  get  assigned  to  different  partitions. 
Within the MILS architecture, application layer entities 
are provided with the mechanisms to control, manage, 
and enforce their own application security policies in a 
manner that ensures that the enforcement mechanisms 
are  NEAT  (Non-bypassable,  Evaluatable,  Always 
invoked, Tamperproof). Non-bypassable means that the 
mechanisms cannot be avoided even through the use of 
lower-level  functions.  Evaluatable  means  that  the 
mechanisms  are  simple  enough  to  be  analyzed  and 
mathematically  verified.  Always  invoked  means  that 
the  mechanisms  are  invoked  every  time  an  action 
occurs (they must mediate every access). Tamperproof 
means  that  the  mechanisms  cannot  be  changed  by 
unauthorized entities. 
 
WIRELESS POLICY ENFORCEMENT 
 
  We defined IEMP (Inter-Enclave Multi-Policy) and 
PEG  (Policy  Enforcement  Graphs)  in  our  earlier 
work
[17, 18].  In  this  paper,  we  extend  MILS 
multi-policies  to  include  wireless  communication 
capabilities  using  the  PEG  approach  that  provides 
guidelines  for  wireless  policies  in  a  way  that  the 
security mechanisms are still NEAT across the entire 
network.  By  doing  this,  we  obtain  a  communication 
architecture  that  allows  the  separation  kernel, 
middleware, and applications to share the responsibility 
of creating a highly secure distributed system. 
 
Wireless Issues: MILS supports security multi-policies 
that  define  what  is  allowed.  The  goal  of  wireless 
policies is to prevent  unauthorized access to  wireless 
broadcasting  of  sensitive  data.  With  increasing 
complexity of computer networks and resources to be 
managed, the PEG approach allows a system architect 
to  develop  a  secure  wireless  network  that  protects 
information  and  prevents  unauthorized  data  access. 
System  security  managers  will  have  a  centralized 
access  and  information  flow  management  over  the 
wired and wireless network. 
  The  scope  of  MILS  wireless  policies  covers  all 
wireless communication devices that are connected to 
the  MILS  network  and  are  developed  for  securing 
wireless  devices  and  transmissions.  Wireless  policies 
address the following issues: 
· Using  end-to-end  data  encryption  on  wireless 
systems and defining the encryption requirements of 
all wireless connections. 
· Using  end-to-end  user  authentication  on  wireless 
systems and defining the authentication requirements 
of all wireless connections. 
· Identifying the legitimate communication source and 
destination channels on the network. 
· Stating who has the responsibility of maintaining the 
wireless system (the system security manager). 
· Preventing  deploying  a  wireless  device  without 
permission  from  the  system  security  manager.  The 
manager reviews the device  to ensure that it has a 
suitable level of security before updating the wireless 
policy with the appropriate handling instructions. 
· Defining  the  equipment  and  protocols  that  will  be 
used.  All  wireless  equipment  is  required  to  be 
registered with the system security manager. 
· Identifying the legitimate wireless access points. 
· Keeping track of the location of entities using GPS 
(Global Positioning System) and control the location 
from  which  a  wireless  entity  can  use  the  system’s 
access  points.  For  example,  Malaney
[10]  used  the 
position of the requesting entity in order to mediate 
entity authentication. He presented a security system 
that uses GPS and signals generated by the wireless J. Computer Sci., 3 (9): 726-735, 2007 
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entities  to  determine  the  location  of  authorized 
entities. 
· Security policies in MILS cover wireless and wired 
networks. If a security attack occurs on the wireless 
network, this attack will not have a tremendous effect 
on the wired network. A network access point is used 
to help facilitate wireless and wired communication. 
Similar to wired networks, wireless networks provide 
entities  with  a  communication  platform  that  allows 
entities  to  connect  with  one  another  and  share 
resources. Unlike wired networks, wireless networks 
use  air  to  transmit  data.  In  order  to  have  more 
coverage area, communication systems usually set up 
more access points. In order to reduce exposure to 
security  vulnerability  when  providing  wireless 
communication through access points, the number of 
access  points  in  the  wireless  network  should  be 
minimized. 
 
MILS  Wireless  Architecture:  Information  access 
controls are the mechanisms involved in the mediation 
of every request to resources and data maintained by a 
system.  Based  on  the  security  policy,  they  determine 
whether the request should be granted or denied. This 
mediation must be performed by a trusted component, 
the MILS Guarded Communications System (GCS). 
 
GCS: Policies are enforced in MILS using mechanisms 
built  into  the  kernel  and  middleware  security 
components.  The  GCS  is  a  logical  subset  of  the 
middleware that consists of libraries and stubs in user 
partitions  as  well  as  individual  enforcement 
mechanisms  in  separate  partitions  (e.g.,  guards, 
downgraders, encryption engines, message routers). In 
the example shown in Fig. 2, the GCS consists of the 
following  trusted  components:  the  PCS,  network 
protocols,  MMR,  and  guard.  The  separation  kernel 
enforces compliance to information flow policies using 
the GCS component. This component can be verified 
independently  and  therefore  can  be  used  to  mediate 
message passing between partitions. 
  The advantage of using the GCS is that the system 
does not have to trust the applications to conform to 
security policies. The GCS will enforce these policies. 
Thus, it is possible to have a secure MILS system while 
running untrusted applications within partitions. This is 
because  the  SK  prevents  any  other  possible  partition 
communication. The SK, in conjunction with the GCS, 
enforces MLS policies. 
  The  GCS  makes  access  decisions  in  individual 
enclaves or between different enclaves using a policy 
database that stores the policies that the GCS will need. 
The  system  security  manager  has  the  authority  to 
specify  security  policies  that  are  enforced  by  the 
system. Auditing can be performed for entity requests; 
a request can be logged as a trace operation which will 
be  used  for  analysis  of  activities  in  the  system. 
Different policies can all exist in one policy database. If 
the invoking entity is allowed to access another entity, 
then access is granted; otherwise it is denied. The GCS 
is  responsible  for  enforcing  and  monitoring  the 
individual security policies and the multi-policies that 
are related to entities involved in the access. 
  The GCS is the collection of policy enforcement 
mechanisms  that  mediate  message  transmission 
between entities. Once an entity makes a request to pass 
information, the request will trigger the policies that are 
related to the requesting entity. The GCS receives the 
request  and  identifies  the  policies  that  have  been 
triggered.  The  GCS  is  separate  from  the  policy 
database, which makes the system flexible and simple; 
the  system  security  manager  will  be  able  to  change 
policies  without  modifying  the  enforcement 
mechanism. 
  To avoid unauthorized disclosure of information, it 
is  necessary  that  messages  are  properly  labeled.  The 
GCS requires a label on all outgoing messages across 
the  network.  Messages  labeled  by  the  GCS  are 
considered MILS compliant (they conform to the MILS 
architecture).  MILS  non-compliant  messages  are  not 
labeled  by  the  GCS  and  are  sent  from  legacy 
(non-MILS) components. When the GCS receives such 
legacy  messages,  it  validates  the  message  and  then 
queries  the  policy  database  for  further  information. 
Based on such information, if the MILS non-compliant 
message is given access permission, then the GCS will 
properly label it so it becomes MILS compliant. The 
specified label in the header of the message should help 
other  MILS  components  (e.g.,  MMR,  guards)  to 
identify  the  message  type  and  therefore  support  the 
communicating message. 
  The  GCS  is  consistent  and  complete.  It  is 
consistent because an entity request is either accepted 
or  denied  but  not  both.  This  is  due  to  the  conflict 
resolution  techniques  that  force  the  GCS  to  make  a 
decision. The GCS is complete because for each entity 
request, there is a result (the access being accepted or 
denied). 
 
PCS:  The  main  security  function  of  the  PCS  is  to 
extend the single processor security policy enforcement 
provided by the MILS separation kernel to a distributed 
computing  environment
[12].  The  MILS  PCS  is  a 
middleware component that  consists of hardware and 
software.  The  PCS  functions  as  a  communication 
interface  that  maintains  secure  communications J. Computer Sci., 3 (9): 726-735, 2007 
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between  entities  running  in  separate  partitions  on 
different processors while enforcing security policies on 
those communications. It reduces the cost of designing, 
evaluating, and deploying highly secure systems. 
  The PCS restricts the use of channel numbers for 
use  by  particular  entities.  It  mediates  interactions 
between entities via channels according to two security 
policies:  the  channel  connectivity  policy  and  the 
resource  management  policy
[12].  The  channel 
connectivity policy describes the allowed connections 
between  entities  within  a  distributed  system.  This 
policy is an IEMP policy limiting which entities may 
directly  communicate  via  channels  provided  by  the 
PCS. The resource management policy describes how 
the shared communication resources used to implement 
channels are to be allocated between channels. The PCS 
provides the following functionalities: 
· Management of shared communication resources to 
provide channel separation. 
· Authentication of entities. 
· Protection of data confidentiality. 
· Verification of data integrity. 
  Using  a  PCS  allows  system  designers  to  locate 
partitions  on  different  processors  without  introducing 
new threats to data confidentiality or integrity due to 
inter-processor  communication  between  those 
partitions
[12].  It  encrypts  data  and  does  entity 
authentication before allowing data to flow. The PCS 
extends  MILS  policies  (data  isolation,  information 
flow,  periods  processing,  damage  limitation  between 
partitions)  to  include  end-to-end  enforcement  of 
policies. Although the PCS guarantees separation in the 
network, it does not have control over each partition, so 
guards and application security are still needed. 
 
Wireless  Network  Example:  The  MILS  wireless 
network  utilizes  devices  (e.g.,  entity  A,  entity  B)  to 
send/receive messages, via the PCS, across a wireless 
network  using  an  access  point,  and  then  to  a  wired 
network  (e.g.,  the  Internet).  Wireless  entity  requests 
have to go through the access points before a decision is 
made to either grant or reject the request. Access points 
have  two  interfaces,  one  is  a  wireless  interface  that 
understands wireless protocols and another is a wired 
interface  that  allows  entities  to  connect  to  the  wired 
network  using  Ethernet.  Security  policies  are 
implemented  by  access  points  before  data  is  being 
transferred from wireless to wired networks. Wireless 
access points regularly transmit encrypted signals so the 
PCS  components  are  aware  of  the  existence  of  such 
access points and can use them for communication. 
  Figure 2  shows  an  example  of  a  MILS  wireless 
network  implementation.  Notice  that  some  partitions 
may  have  an  application  without  a  middleware;  this 
simplifies the design. Steps 1 through 8 show how a 
message  gets  transferred  from  entity  A  to  entity  B. 
Notice that the dashed line pattern indicates a wireless 
communication, whereas the solid line pattern indicates 
a wired communication. If any of the components along 
the message path rejects the message request, then an 
error will be generated and sent back to the requesting 
entity (entity A) informing it of request rejection. 
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Fig. 2: MILS wireless network implementation. 
 
· Step 1: The message that entity A sends is mediated 
by the CORBA middleware and if access is granted, 
then the message is sent to the MMR. 
· Step 2: The MMR enforces finer granularity policies. 
If the message is of a specific type, then the MMR 
routes  this  message  to  an  appropriate  guard.  If  the 
guard determines that the content of the message is 
not in compliance with information flow policy, the 
guard  will  notify  the  MMR  which  will  reject  the 
message.  If  access  is  granted,  then  the  message  is 
sent to the PCS. 
· Step 3: The PCS checks the network protocols and 
encrypts the message before it is transmitted over to a 
wireless access point. 
· Step 4: The access point transmits the message over 
to the wired network. 
· Step 5:  The  network  sends  the  message  to  the 
destination access point. 
· Step 6:  The  wireless  access  point  transmits  the 
message to the destination PCS. 
· Step 7: The PCS checks the network protocols and 
decrypts the message and if access is granted, it will 
send the message to the MMR. 
· Step 8:  The  MMR  routes  the  message  to  an 
appropriate  guard.  If  access  is  granted,  then  the J. Computer Sci., 3 (9): 726-735, 2007 
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message  is  sent  to  the  CORBA  middleware  that 
mediates the message before entity B receives it. 
 
POLICY REFINEMENT 
 
  In our model, entities are divided into two subsets, 
trusted and untrusted. Trusted entities consist of trusted 
computing components (TCC) that are solely used to 
enforce the security policies of a given system such as 
the MMR, guard, and PCS. They take the transferred 
messages  and  security  policies  associated  with  the 
communication path as input and output the modified 
messages.  The  possible  modifications  of  a  message 
could  be  encryption,  downgrade,  or  even  deletion 
which means the information flow is illegal. All other 
entities within the system are untrusted. Applications, 
such as those that provide ordinary functionalities of a 
given  system,  fall  into  this  category.  Each  untrusted 
entity is assigned a security classification. An untrusted 
entity is said to be single level if it processes data of 
one security classification and multi-level if it processes 
data of multiple security classifications. 
  Policy  refinement  is  the  decomposition  of 
high-level  policies  into  lower-level,  more  specific 
policies that can be enforced by the system
[20]. In order 
to secure the system, security mechanisms need to be 
selected  to  enforce  the  desired  policies.  The 
enforcement  procedure  is  implemented  by 
incorporating security mechanisms which transform the 
application  view  of  the  system  into  its  low-level 
implementation view. Transformation, in our system, is 
then  defined  in  terms  of  the  refinement  steps  for  a 
security  enforcement  procedure  of  an  application 
system, namely the procedure of plug-in TCC. 
  The goal of refining high-level policies into more 
specific  policies  is  to  reach  an  implementable 
configuration in which the information flow graph has 
no specific edge policies. The use of refinement  will 
reduce the proof effort for secure components. In order 
to facilitate the transformation (or implementation) of a 
secure computer system, we present the following set of 
rules: 
 
Transformation  Rule  4:  No  direct  communication 
channel  is  allowed  between  entities  classified  at 
different classifications. 
 
Transformation  Rule  5:  Information  flow  between 
untrusted entities having different classifications must 
be mediated. More specifically, it must pass through a 
trusted computing component. 
 
Transformation  Rule  6:  Typed  messages  must  be 
sanitized by a guard with the same type. An entity is 
connected  with  a  corresponding  guard  based  on  the 
message type it transfers. 
 
Transformation Rule 7: Inter-partition communication 
must pass through an MMR. 
 
Transformation Rule 8: Inter-processor communication 
must pass through a PCS. 
 
Policy  Conjunction  Rule  9:  Policy  of  a  guard  is  the 
union  of  security  policies  associated  with  the 
communication channels that it mediates and IEMP. 
 
Policy Conjunction Rule 10: Policy of an MMR is the 
union of inter-partition and edge policies and IEMP. 
 
Policy  Conjunction  Rule  11:  Policy  of  a  PCS  is  the 
union of inter-processor policies and IEMP. 
 
  The principle operations of policy refinement are 
the following: 
1.  Allocate entities to different partitions according to 
their security classification to ensure data isolation. 
This is the application of Transformation Rule 4. 
2.  Integrate  a  guard  to  enforce  policies  associated 
with  communication  channels.  This  is  the 
application  of  Transformation  Rule  5.  The 
operation  can  be  further  refined  into  three  steps. 
First,  connect  each  entity  with  a  corresponding 
guard  based  on  the  message  type  it  transfers, 
following Transformation Rule 6. Second, combine 
the policies of the original channels using IEMP to 
form the policy of the guard, according to Policy 
Conjunction  Rule  9.  Last,  assign  each 
communication  channel  a  policy  stipulating  the 
type of messages it can transfer, which is the type 
of  message  the  guard  sanitized,  following 
Transformation Rule 6. 
3.  Integrate  an  MMR  to  enforce  inter-partition  and 
edge policies. According to Transformation Rule 7, 
we  further  refine  the  above  implementation  by 
incorporating  an  MMR.  Inter-partition 
communication must pass through and be mediated 
by  an  MMR.  Allowed  information  will  then  be 
routed to a corresponding guard based on its type 
(e.g., a GIOP message is sent to a GIOP Guard). It 
takes two steps to accomplish the transformation. 
First, incorporate an MMR between a guard and an 
untrusted entity, following Transformation Rule 7. 
Second,  form  the  policy  of  MMR,  according  to 
Policy Conjunction Rule 10. 
4.  Integrate a PCS to enforce inter-processor policies. 
According  to  Transformation  Rule  8,  we  further 
refine the above implementation by incorporating a 
PCS.  Inter-processor  communication  must  pass J. Computer Sci., 3 (9): 726-735, 2007 
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through  and  be  mediated  by  a  PCS.  Allowed 
information will then be routed to a corresponding 
PCS,  forming  the  policies  of  PCS,  according  to 
Policy Conjunction Rule 11. 
 
  Different policy models in the literature have been 
developed to restrict information access. Although most 
systems  are  restricted  to  a  single  policy  model  to 
provide security
[15], our proposed approach is capable 
of dealing with multiple policies from different models 
that are being enforced by the system. 
  Manley et al.
[11]  pointed  out  a  major  security 
concern with wireless security: they stated that 70% of 
the data transmitted through wireless access points is 
unencrypted. They proposed a framework of a reliable 
wireless  security  policy  and  examined  the  wireless 
security policies of the Department of Defense based on 
their  framework.  Arbaugh
[3]  argued  that  wireless 
security requires slightly different thinking from wired 
security  primarily  because  it  gives  potential  attackers 
easy medium access which increases systems’ security 
threat. 
  Although  significant  work  in  developing  policy 
refinement  strategies  has  been  done,  several 
researchers, including Bandara et al.
[4], pointed out that 
more issues remain to be addressed. They presented an 
approach to policy refinement that allows inferencing 
of low-level actions that satisfy a high-level goal. Zhou 
and  Alves-Foss
[20]  proposed  architecture-based 
refinement  techniques  for  the  design  of  multi-level 
secure systems. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
  This  paper  outlines  a  wireless  inter-enclave 
multi-policy  technique  that  provides  system  security 
managers  with  a  framework  for  supporting  the 
enforcement of diverse security multi-policies in MILS, 
a high assurance computer system design for security 
and safety-critical multi-enclave systems. 
  In  order  to  address  new  challenges  of  wireless 
security,  system  security  managers  should  constantly 
review policies to ensure that new threats are covered 
by  the  existing  policies.  As  security  attacks  and 
communication environments are constantly changing, 
security  researchers  should  implement  a  thorough 
assessment  in  order  to  identify  new  security 
vulnerabilities.  In  order  to  minimize  security  risks,  a 
better  understanding  of  wireless  technology  and  its 
effect  on  the  enforcement  of  security  policies  is 
essential. The relationship between wireless technology 
and security engineering introduces new challenges that 
need to be investigated. The approach proposed in this 
paper  is  an  important  step  towards  defining 
(understanding) this relationship. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
  We  wish  to  acknowledge  the  United  States  Air 
Force  Research  Laboratory  (AFRL)  and  Defense 
Advanced  Research  Projects  Agency  (DARPA)  for 
their  support.  This  material  is  based  on  research 
sponsored  by  AFRL  and  DARPA  under  agreement 
number  F30602-02-1-0178.  The  U.S.  Government  is 
authorized  to  reproduce  and  distribute  reprints  for 
governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright 
notation thereon. The views and conclusions contained 
herein  are  those  of  the  authors  and  should  not  be 
interpreted  as  necessarily  representing  the  official 
policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, 
of AFRL, DARPA, or the U.S. Government. We also 
wish  to  acknowledge  the  anonymous  reviewers  and 
journal editors for reviewing this paper. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1.  Alves-Foss, J.,  W. S. Harrison,  P. Oman,  and 
C. Taylor,  2006. The  MILS  architecture  for  high 
assurance embedded systems. International Journal 
of Embedded Systems, 2 (3/4): 239-247. 
2.  Alves-Foss, J.,  C. Taylor,  and  P. Oman,  2004.  A 
multi-layered  approach  to  security  in  high 
assurance  systems.  In  Proceedings  of  the  37th 
Annual  Hawaii  International  Conference  on 
System Sciences. 
3.  Arbaugh, W. A.,  2003.  Wireless  security  is 
different. Computer, 36 (8): 99-101. 
4.  Bandara, A. K.,  E. C. Lupu,  J. Moffett,  and 
A. Russo, 2004. A goal-based approach to policy 
refinement.  In  Proceedings  of  the  5th  IEEE 
International Workshop on Policies for Distributed 
Systems and Networks, pp: 229-239. 
5.  Bell, D. E.  and  L. J. LaPadula,  1976.  Secure 
computer  systems:  Unified  exposition  and 
MULTICS  interpretation.  Technical  Report 
ESD-TR-75-306, MITRE Corporation MTR-2997 
Rev. 1. 
6.  Department  of  Defense,  1985.  Trusted  computer 
system  evaluation  criteria.  Computer  Security 
Center. No. DoD 5200.28-STD. 
7.  Harrison, W. S.,  N. Hanebutte,  P. Oman,  and 
J. Alves-Foss, 2005. The MILS architecture for a 
secure  global  information  grid.  Crosstalk:  The 
Journal  of  Defense  Software  Engineering, 
18 (10): 20-24. J. Computer Sci., 3 (9): 726-735, 2007 
 
  735 
8.  Heimdahl, M. P. E.  and  C. L. Heitmeyer,  1998. 
Formal  methods  for  developing  high  assurance 
computer  systems:  Working  group  report.  In 
Proceedings  of  the  2nd  IEEE  Workshop  on 
Industrial  Strength  Formal  Specification 
Techniques, pp: 60-64. 
9.  Lockheed-Martin,  Boeing,  Rockwell  Collins, 
Green  Hills  Software,  LynuxWorks,  Objective 
Interface,  and  the  University  of  Idaho,  2003. 
Protection  profile  for  partitioning  kernels  in 
environments  requiring  augmented  high 
robustness.  Version 1.3,  submitted  for  the  Open 
Group and the Information Assurance Directorate 
of the National Security Agency. 
10.  Malaney, R. A., 2004. A location enabled wireless 
security system. In Proceedings of the IEEE Global 
Telecommunications  Conference,  volume 4, 
pp: 2196-2200. 
11.  Manley, M. E.,  C. A. McEntee,  A. M. Molet,  and 
J. S. Park,  2005.  Wireless  security  policy 
development  for  sensitive  organizations.  In 
Proceedings of the IEEE Workshop on Information 
Assurance and Security, pp: 150-157. 
12.  Objective  Interface  Systems,  2005.  Protection 
profile for partitioning communications systems in 
environments  requiring  high  robustness.  Draft 
V0.85. 
13.  Perrig, A.,  J. Stankovic,  and  D. Wagner,  2004. 
Security  in  wireless  sensor  networks. 
Communications of the ACM, 47 (6): 53-57. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14.  Rushby, J. M.,  1981.  Design  and  verification  of 
secure  systems.  In  Proceedings  of  the  8th  ACM 
Symposium  on  Operating  System  Principles, 
pp: 12-21. 
15.  Spencer, R.,  S. Smalley,  P. Loscocco,  M. Hibler, 
D. Andersen,  and  J. Lepreau,  1999.  The  Flask 
security  architecture:  System  support  for  diverse 
security  policies.  In  Proceedings  of  the  8th 
USENIX Security Symposium, pp: 123-139. 
16.  Verma, D.,  2000.  Policy-Based  Networking: 
Architectures  and  Algorithms.  New  Riders 
Publishing. 
17.  Wahsheh, L. A.  and  J. Alves-Foss,  2006. 
Specifying and enforcing a multi-policy paradigm 
for high assurance multi-enclave systems. Journal 
of High Speed Networks, 15 (3): 315-327. 
18.  Wahsheh, L. A.  and  J. Alves-Foss,  2007.  Using 
policy  enforcement  graphs  in  a  separation-based 
high assurance architecture. In Proceedings of the 
IEEE  International  Conference  on  Information 
Reuse and Integration, pp: 183-189. 
19.  White, P., W. Vanfleet, and C. Dailey, 2000. High 
assurance architecture via separation kernel. Draft. 
20.  Zhou, J.  and  J. Alves-Foss,  2007.  Security  policy 
refinement  and  enforcement  for  the  design  of 
multi-level  secure  systems.  Journal  of  Computer 
Security. In press. 
 